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The Usury Issue in Public Utility Late
Payment Charges
WARREN J. SAMUELS*
Notwithstanding the legislative and judicial trend toward
greater protection for consumers, the late charge billing sys-
tems of public utilities have escaped consumer regulation. Con-
sumer advocates have argued, inter alia, that the late payment
charge is really a form of interest and therefore subject to stat-
utory usury limitations. Courts and commissions have resisted
this attack by classifying late charges in other ways, thereby
increasing confusion among jurisdictions about the real nature
of the late payment charge. The author proposes to unravel
this complexity by examining and comparing the different ju-
dicial perceptions of the late payment charge, as well as by
providing a comprehensive analysis of the interest
classification.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, consumers have shown an increasing will-
ingness to challenge the legality of the techniques that public utili-
ties have adopted to induce customers to pay their bills promptly.
* Professor of Economics, Michigan State University; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin
(1957).
This article is the partial result of a comprehensive study of public utility late payment
charge systems. The author is indebted to most of the state public service Commissions, to
numerous public utility companies, and to private and legal-aid attorneys for a variety of
data and materials. He is also indebted to Harry M. Trebing for the benefits of frequent
discusssions.
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These techniques include customer deposits, extra charges for late
payment, and disconnection with a fee for reconnection. Although
these techniques met with the approval of public service commis-
sions even at the outset, consumers have secured important sub-
stantive and procedural rights vis-a-vis the utility companies
before both the commissions and the courts.'
The late payment charge has been the center of much litiga-
tion and many administrative actions challenging utility billing
practices.2 One controversial issue in the litigation and administra-
tive actions has been whether state laws prohibiting usurious rates
of interest or comparable charges apply to late payment charges.
The attacks on late charges on usury grounds almost invariably
have been unsuccessful. The decisions by commissions and by
courts have, nonetheless, raised important analytical and jurispru-
dential questions, while evidencing the confusion of judges and
commissioners about the functions of the late payment charge and
of usury law.8
Three principal questions are crucial in determining whether a
late payment charge will survive an attack under the usury laws.
The first question is whether the late charge is an interest charge.
If the late charge is interest, the court or commission must next
decide whether the effective interest rate exceeds the limit in the
applicable usury statute. A final question is whether a late charge
that constitutes interest at a usurious rate nevertheless falls within
1. Michigan has perhaps the most advanced set of procedural safeguards for consumers.
See MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, CONSUMER STANDARDS AND BILLING PRACTICES,
Rules 460.2101-.2199 (1974). For a discussion of a possible constitutional source for procedu-
ral rights of utility customers, see Note, Constitutional Safeguards for Public Utility Cus-
tomers: Power to the People, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (1973). But cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (conduct of a privately owned but publicly regulated utility
corporation is not state action).
2. See Note, Determining the Reasonableness of Public Utility Late Charges, 26 KAN.
L. REV. 595 (1978). See generally Samuels, Commentary: Utility Late Payment Charges, 19
WAYNE L. REV. 1151 (1973).
3. See Sections III and IV infra. Confusion also surrounds the applicability of usury
statutes to public utility bonds or debentures issued during periods of high bond rates.
Some commentators have expressed concern that a utility issuing bonds at a competitive
interest rate may subject its bondholders to civil and criminal penalties for usurious lending.
These commentators suggest that the tortuous and subtle distinctions drawn by the courts
among transactions in applying the usury laws may generate such uncertainty that investors
will shy away from utility bonds. See, e.g., Blitz, California Public Utilities and the Usury
Law, 50 L.A. B. BULL. 180 (1975).
The usury issue has also appeared in public utility law when utilities have argued that
the interest they must pay on customer deposits is usurious; they simultaneously argue that
the effective annual interest rate generated by a five percent nonrecurring late payment
charge is not usurious. See 52 PA. CODE §§ 56.22, .57 (1979).
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a statutory exemption from the usury laws.
This article will survey, interpret, and criticize recent develop-
ments in commission and court decisions regarding challenges on
usury grounds to public utility charges for late payment. Following
this introduction, Section II will review several recent leading
cases, and Section III will discuss the nature of late payment
charges. Section IV examines the availability of statutory usury ex-
emptions for the late payment charge, while Section V discusses
the calculation of the effective rate of interest represented by a
particular late charge. Section VI sets forth some broad conclu-
sions derived from this analysis of the application of usury law to
the late charge.
Three matters require clarification at the outset. First, the
revenue from late payment charges does not necessarily increase
the profits of the utility companies. Late charges are a method of
recouping the actual costs to the utility from late customer pay-
ments-the expenses of collection and the loss of working capital
until the consumer pays the utility bill. Public utility regulators
take account of these costs in calculating the rates utilities may
charge to earn a permissible rate of return on the rate base. The
regulators do not allow the utility to earn more than the set rate of
return, whether the utility covers its costs of late payment with a
separate late charge or simply includes the costs of late payment in
its basic service charge. Regulatory lag, however, may allow the
revenue from late charges to rise temporarily above the actual
costs of late payment to the utility. Even when this happens, the
extra profit the utility earns is small, for the total revenue a utility
receives from late charges is typically an infinitesimal percentage
of total revenues.4
The second point that will help clarify the discussion of late
charges is that the utility companies use many terms, some of
them misleading, to denote a late charge. For example, penalty
charges, forfeited discounts, net-gross differentials, and finance
charges are all charges for late payment. The terms "forfeited dis-
count" and "net-gross differential" are particularly misleading.
Under the "forfeited discount" or "net-gross" system, the net or
lower amount is the amount that the utility charges for its gas or
electric service. The gross amount is the net amount plus the late
4. See 1975 REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITEE ON UTILITY BILLING PRACTICES, NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS [hereinafter cited as 1975
NARUC REPORT].
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payment charge. There is no "discount" taken from the basic
charge. Indeed, if the utility in fact discounted its bill for regular
service and all customers took advantage of the discount, then the
company would have inadequate revenue to meet its costs, given
rate limitations. The "discount," therefore, is only an avoided late
charge.5 In the following discussion, the terms "late payment
charge" or "late charge" are used except when legal analysis re-
quires the use of another term. The synonyms for a late charge are
legally significant in the discussion of the status of the charges as
interest, for utilities use these synonyms in part to encourage
courts and commissions not to categorize late charges as interest.
The third point to keep in mind is that legal developments
have severely compromised the integrity of the interest rate ceil-
ings of usury statutes. In the contemporary United States econ-
omy, the vast majority of transactions involving interest fall under
some exception to the usury limits, although other statutes often
regulate interest rates in cases not covered by the usury law. The
current weakness of the usury statutes in so many contexts makes
ironic the use of usury law as a weapon to reform utility billing
practices.
II. RECENT LEADING CASES
Three recent cases illustrate the typical approaches that
courts and commissions have taken to analyze whether late charges
are usurious interest. Although the decisions have followed differ-
ent rationales, each case has reached the same result, concluding
that a utility's late charges constitute not interest subject to usury
laws, but a device to recover the costs incurred by the utility be-
cause of late payments.
In Coffelt v. Arkansas Power & Light Co.,7 a customer of a
utility company brought a class action against it on behalf of all
customers who bought electric power from the utility. The plaintiff
alleged that the utility imposed late payment charges on its cus-
tomers in violation of the state constitution's prohibition against
usury.' The trial court upheld the validity of the late charge, and
5. Samuels, supra note 2, at 1153-54; see 1972 REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON
UTILITY BILLING PRACTICES, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
[hereinafter cited as 1972 NARUC REPORT].
6. See Section IV infra.
7. 248 Ark. 313, 451 S.W.2d 881 (1970).
8. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13. The statutes that implement this constitutional prohibi-
tion are 68 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 602, 603 (1979). The late payment charge in Coffelt was 8%
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the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed.0
The utility company called its late payment charge a net-gross
differential, but the supreme court did not find that term determi-
native of whether the charge was usurious. The court explained
that "[wle use the phrase 'late charge' merely for convenience. The
practice has also been said to involve a discount for prompt pay-
ment, a penalty for tardy payment, a gross-net rate differential
. . . . We are interested not in nomenclature but in the substan-
tive nature of the charge." 10 To determine the substantive nature
of the charge, the court looked to the reasons given by the Arkan-
sas Public Service Commission when it first authorized the late
payment charge. The Commission authorized the charge solely as a
device to ensure that late payers, rather than all utility customers,
would bear the costs caused by the late payers. If the utility were
to include the costs of late payment in its basic charge, those who
paid their bills on time would suffer discrimination, because they
would be paying for costs they had not created.11 Adopting this
reasoning, the supreme court concluded that the late payment
charge was simply a device to allow the utility to recover the costs
caused by late payers without discriminating against timely payers.
The court decided that because the late charge was a cost recovery
device it was not a charge for an extension of credit. The late
charge was not interest and therefore could not be usurious."
In State ex rel. Guste v. Council of New Orleans,"5 the Attor-
ney General of Louisiana brought suit against a utility company
and the city council that regulated it. The attorney general, acting
on behalf of customers of the utility, asserted that the late pay-
ment charge authorized by the city council and imposed by the
of the first $15 of the net bill and 2% of the excess. The due and payable period (the period
from the time the utility sends out its bill until the customer becomes liable for the late
payment charge) was ten business days. 248 Ark. at 314, 451 S.W.2d at 882.
9. 248 Ark. 313, 451 S.W.2d 881. The plaintiff did not respond to the affidavits the
utility presented with its motion for summary judgment, but instead rested solely on its
verified complaint. The trial court and the Arkansas Supreme Court therefore accepted the
facts established by the affidavits as controlling. Id. at 315-16, 451 S.W.2d at 883.
10. Id. at 314, 451 S.W.2d at 882.
11. Id. at 314-15, 451 S.W.2d at 882. When the Commission authorized the late charge,
it required the utility to keep records of the actual costs that late payment caused the com-
pany. The Commission could then adjust the amount of the late charge so that it did not
exceed the actual cost of late payment. Id. at 315, 451 S.W.2d at 883.
12. Id. at 316-17, 451 S.W.2d at 883-84. The court called the late payment charge "a
practical method of preventing discrimination" among the customers of the utility. Id. at
317, 451 S.W.2d 883.
13. 297 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd, 309 So. 2d 290 (La. 1975).
1980]
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utility was usurious interest." The trial court found for the utility
and city council. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth
Circuit reversed and held that the late charge was usurious. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana again reversed and reinstated the trial
court judgment for the defendants. 15
The utility and city council made two arguments before the
court of appeals that the late payment charge was not interest.
They first argued, based on the reasoning of the court in Coffelt,
that the late charge was a device to prevent rate discrimination by
assessing the costs of late payment against those who paid their
bills late. The court of appeals rejected this argument. The utility
in Guste, unlike the utility in Coffelt, admitted that the late charge
covered costs not ascribable to late paying customers, such as the
cost of writing off uncollectible accounts. The court of appeals con-
cluded that the late payment charge, far from being an antidis-
criminatory device, was itself unjustly discriminatory. 16 Because
Louisiana public utility law forbade unjust and discriminatory
rates, the court concluded that the late charge was "in fact not a
utility rate. 17
The second argument the defendants made before the court of
appeals was that the late charge was a time-price differential
rather than interest. They argued that the utility customers could
choose to pay the "net" rate by paying on time or the "gross" rate
by paying late; and that this choice was like the choice of a buyer
of goods who chose to pay a higher "time" price to obtain credit
rather than pay a lower cash price at once. Relying orl the defini-
tion of interest in the Louisiana Civil Code, the court of appeals
rejected the characterization of the late charge as a time-price dif-
ferential. The Code defined interest as the "damages due for delay
in the performance of an obligation to pay money."'" Such "dam-
ages," to the court, constituted a payment by the debtor for the
use of money over the time of the delay in payment. The court
distinguished interest payments for the use of money over time
from an addition to the sales price of goods to cover credit that the
14. 297 So. 2d at 520. The late charge was 10% of the bill. The due and payable period
was ten days. Id. at 519. The general interest rate ceiling in Louisiana was 8%. LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 2924 (West 1952 & Supp. 1980).
15. 309 So. 2d at 292.
16. 297 So. 2d at 523-24. The intermediate court asserted that "[tihere is no relation-
ship between costs of uncollectible accounts and expenses related to past due accounts." Id.
at 523.
17. Id. at 524.
18. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 1935 (West 1977).
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seller extended to the buyer. 9 Here, the late charge was the same
no matter how long after the due date the customer delayed pay-
ment; it did not depend on the amount of credit the utility was
willing to extend to its customers. The court concluded that the
late charge was a damage payment to the utility for the customer's
delay, not an addition to the price of electrical service to cover
credit extended to the customer. Under the Louisiana Civil Code,
therefore, the late charge was interest."0
Having found the late charge to be interest, the court of ap-
peals easily concluded that the charge was usurious. The general
Louisiana interest rate ceiling was eight percent. The effective rate
of the late charge far exceeded that ceiling. The utility could not
rely on a statutory exemption from interest rate ceilings for public
utility rates2l because the court found the late charge was not a
valid utility rate. The late charge was therefore usurious.22
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the court
of appeals and reinstated the trial court judgment for the defen-
dants. The supreme court noted that the Louisiana usury statute"
applied only to loans and not to "consumer credit sales."2 4 The
court then found that the provision of services by a utility was a
consumer credit sale because it involved the sale of a commodity,
electricity, to consumers. The general usury statute therefore did
not apply to public utility charges.28 The Louisiana Consumer
Credit Act governed consumer credit sales, but it specifically ex-
empted from its restrictions public utility rates regulated by a
19. 297 So. 2d at 525.
20. Id. The court found precedent for its distinction between damages for a delay in
payment and a time-price differential in the case of Dendinger, Inc. v. Emury & Eichhorn,
12 La. App. 39, 124 So. 604 (1929). In Dendinger, a contract for the sale of lumber provided
for a 10% addition to the sales price if the buyer did not pay by a-certain date. The court
characterized the additional charge, which was the same regardless of the length of time the
buyer delayed payment, as a penalty. The court rejected the argument that the penalty was
a time-price differential, and held that the penalty was an interest payment because it con-
stituted damages for a delay in payment.
21. The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act does not apply
to public utility rates. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1406(1) (West Supp. 1980). Public utility
rates are also exempted from the interest ceilings of the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3512(3) (West Supp. IV 1980).
22. 297 So. 2d at 526. The court of appeals found that the city of New Orleans had
exceeded its charter powers when it authorized the usurious late charge, and that it was
bound by the decision against the utility. Id.
23. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2924 (West Supp. 1980).
24. 309 So. 2d 290, 296 (La. 1975).
25. Id.
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state agency 28 or subdivision. Since a subdivision of the State of
Louisiana, the Council of the City of New Orleans, regulated the
rates of the defendant utility, the Consumer Credit Act was also
inapplicable. Regulation of public utility rates thus rested solely
with the Council.2 7 The court apparently preferred that the agency
charged by the legislature with regulating utility rates have unfet-
tered control over those rates.
In Delich v. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.,2 s the Iowa Com-
merce Commission rejected a usury attack on a late payment
charge, relying on the statutory exemption argument successfully
expounded in Guste. The Commission ultimately concluded that
its jurisdiction over public utility rates was preemptive and that
the usury statute was therefore inapplicable. In reaching this con-
clusion, the Commission considered the reach of Iowa's usury stat-
ute, the Iowa Consumer Credit Code, 0 and the statutes vesting
the Commission with regulatory authority over public utilities.3
The Commission first acknowledged that Iowa's general usury stat-
ute did not specifically exempt public utility rates from its opera-
tion.3 2 The Iowa Consumer Credit Code did, however, expressly ex-
empt public utility rates regulated by state agencies.33 The
Commission then asserted that it had the statutory authority to
regulate "all rates and charges of public utilities not specifically
exempted. ' '8 4 Reading the Consumer Credit Code exemption to-
26. 9 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3512(3) (West Supp. IV 1980).
27. 309 So. 2d at 296. Judicial review of ratemaking actions by administrative bodies
such as the city council is confined to an inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the adminis-
trative action. The supreme court found that the late payment charge approved by the city
council was nondiscriminatory and reasonable. The court reasoned that the revenue the util-
ity received from the charges imposed on delinquent customers nearly equalled the total
costs that the delinquent customers created. Because customers who paid on time caused
neither the costs of late payment nor the costs of uncollectible accounts, it was reasonable
for the city council to conclude that timely payers should not bear those costs. Id. at 294-95.
But cf. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 28 Pub. U. Rep. 4th 398, 435-36 (Mo. P.S.C. 1979)
(late charge that includes the cost of uncollectible accounts. discriminates against late payers
and should be reduced to include only the costs of late payment).
28. 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th 335 (Iowa Com. Comm'n 1975).
29. IOWA CODE § 535.2 (1975) (amended 1978 & 1979); id. § 535.4 (1975).
30. Id. §§ 537.1101-.7103 (1975).
31. Id. § 490A.1-.27 (1975) (renumbered. 1977 as §§ 476.1-.27).
32. 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th at 337.
33. IOWA CODE § 537.1202(3) (1975). One might wonder whether the Consumer Credit
Code exemption was logically necessary in light of the preemptive nature of the Iowa public
utility rate regulation. If the Commission was correct in its interpretation of its own juris-
diction, then the Consumer Credit Code would be preempted along with the usury statute.
See Section IV infra.
34. 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th at 338. IowA CODE § 490A.21 (1975) (renumbered 1977 as §
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gether with the statute granting the Commission regulatory au-
thority over public utilities, the Commission reasoned that the leg-
islature intended late payment charges to be regulated under the
statute specifically for public utilities rather than under the stat-
utes on interest rates and credit transactions generally.-3 The Com-
mission concluded that it had exclusive jurisdiction over public
utility rates and that the usury statute was not applicable.,"
Although the statutory usury exemption found in Delich made
it unnecessary for the Commission to analyze the nature of the late
charge to see whether it was usurious, the Commission undertook
such an analysis in dicta. 7 Interest, under Iowa law, was the con-
sideration a debtor gave a creditor in return for "forbearance" by
the creditor in collecting a debt.8 8 The Commission noted that the
utility's late charge was fixed and nonrecurring. The amount of the
charge remained the same no matter how long the utility refrained
from disconnecting service or suing the customer. Because the cus-
tomer could not pay an additional late charge for additional for-
bearance, the Commission reasoned the late charge could not be
consideration for forbearance by the utility in collecting its bill. 9
The Commission concluded that the late charge was therefore not
an interest payment, but was simply a device by which the utility
recovered the costs of late payment. 0
Coffelt, Guste, and Delich highlight the main analytical and
legal issues raised in usury attacks on late payment charges. The
decisions share important similarities. In all three cases, the high-
est court or agency to analyze the usury attack concluded that gen-
476.15) provides that the jurisdiction of the Iowa Commerce Commission over public utili-
ties extends "to the full extent permitted by the constitution and laws of the United
States."
35. 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th at 337-40.
36. Id. at 338. A more recent case in which a court relied on a statutory exemption
argument to find that a late charge was not usurious is Jones v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 222
Kan. 390, 565 P.2d 597 (1977). In Jones, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the Kansas
Consumer Credit Code, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-1-101 to -9-102 (1974 & Supp. 1979), pre-
empted all other usury laws in the field of consumer transaction; that the sale of utility
services was a consumer transaction; but that the Consumer Credit Code exempted regu-
lated public utility rates from its restrictions. Public utility rates in Kansas were therefore
to be regulated only by the utility commission. 222 Kan. at 397-98, 555 P.2d at 603-04. The
court in Jones, like the supreme court in Guste and the Commission in Delich, upheld ex-
clusive authority in the utility commissioners to regulate rates in any reasonable manner.
37. 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th at 339.
38. Id. at 339-40, 343.
39. Id. at 341.
40. Id. at 341-42. Cf. Guste, 297 So. 2d at 518 (nonrecurring nature of the late charge
made the charge more like interest, not less).
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eral interest rate limitations do not apply to late charges and that
utility regulators have exclusive responsibility for ensuring that
utility rates, including late charges, are reasonable. In all three de-
cisions, the court or agency decided that the late charge was not
interest and that usury limitations therefore could not apply to the
charge. In Guste and Delich, the Supreme Court of Louisiana and
the Iowa Commerce Commission, respectively, held that statutory
exemptions of utility rates from the consumer credit statutes imply
an exemption for public utility rates from the general state usury
law. In the final Guste decision, as in Coffelt and Delich, the court
characterized the late charge as a device through which the utility
could recover the costs of late payment from those who paid their
bills late, thereby preventing the rate discrimination against timely
payers that would result if they had to pay the utility for costs
caused by late payers.
The Coffelt, Guste, and Delich cases raise the problems associ-
ated with the different perceptions of the late payment charge, as
evidenced by the alternative rationales expounded by the courts
and the Commission to reach the same result. These different per-
ceptions of the purpose of the late payment charge, combined with
the differences among state usury statutes, make it difficult to de-
velop a uniform body of law on the issue of whether a late payment
charge is usurious interest. The decisions give varying explanations
of the analytical differences among a loan, an extension of credit,
and an act of forbearance by a creditor utility for a mere delay by
the customer in paying his bill.
The confusion in Coffelt, Guste, Delich, and subsequent cases
leaves us with numerous questions for which there are no clear an-
swers. In Guste, for example, the court drew a distinction between
a charge for the use of money over time and an addition to the
price of an item (a "time-price differential") because payment for
the item is deferred over time. But the court never explained the
analytical or economic differences between these two concepts.
Still another example of the confusion generated by these decisions
concerns the nonrecurring nature of late charges, insofar as they
are distinguishable from credit charges. In Delich, the nonrecur-
rence of the late charge led the Commission to conclude that the
charge was not interest. In Guste, however, the nonrecurring na-
ture of the charge helped persuade the court of appeals that the
late charge was interest. How may one reconcile these decisions?
Further, even when a court decides that a late charge is interest,
how should it calculate the effective rate of that interest?
1168 [Vol. 34:1159
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In part, the thesis of this article is that the questions raised by
the Coffelt, Guste, and Delich decisions have no absolute answers.
The distinctions that courts and commissons use in discussing late
charges may lack analytical legal content, but they do draw sub-
stance from the realm of policy. It is thus important to analyze the
reasons behind the use of varying characterizations of the late
charge.
III. THE NATURE OF THE LATE PAYMENT CHARGE
The most conspicuous feature of the controversy over the na-
ture of the late payment charge is the enormous diversity of per-
ceptions. However designated, the late payment charge is inher-
ently complex and has multiple facets, each of which may be seen
as independent and exclusive of the others. The charge may be
identified alternatively as a cost recovery device, a penalty, a for-
feited discount, an inducement to prompt payment, or a credit
charge, as well as interest. Thus, even though the court in Coffelt
could say that it was "interested not in nomenclature but in the
substantive nature of the charge,"' another court could advance
the view that there is "nothing in this [imposition of a late charge]
but the offer of a discount for prompt payment. '4 2 Of the company
respondents to an Edison Electric survey in 1974, thirty-five de-
scribed their late payment charge as a penalty, eight as a discount
for prompt payment, and seven as interest.'3 A company witness in
a Maryland case argued that the charge was a cost recovery device
and not solely interest. 4 Two spokesmen for one utility also dif-
fered, one saying that the late charge was a penalty and not a dis-
count, the other saying that it was a discount for prompt pay-
ment.45 The 1975 Report of the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC) Ad Hoc Committee on Utility
Billing Practices states that a late charge is an inducement to
41. 248 Ark. 313, 314, 451 S.W.2d 881, 882 (1970).
42. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Napoletano, 277 A.D. 441, 444, 101 N.Y.S.2d
57, 59 (1950).
43. Edison Electric Institute, Questionnaire Covering Electric Utility Billing Practices
for Use in EEI Rate Research Committee Meeting at 2 (Apr. 22-23, 1974).
44. Brief for Joint Petitioners at 9, People's Counsel & Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., No.
7163 (Md. P.S.C., brief dated Jan. 29, 1979) (quoting from Transcript at 690). The witness,
Mr. Monte Edwards, counsel for the Washington Gas Light Company, stated that "to char-
acterize it [the late payment charge] solely as interest earned by the utility I think is inap-
propriate in this proceeding." Id.
45. Louisville Times, Nov. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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prompt payment, 46 rather than credit charge,47 but also states it is
a charge for the use of funds."' One can sympathize, then, with the
former chairman of the District of Columbia Public Service Com-
mission who, after concluding that a late payment charge was not
interest and was not in violation of the credit laws, added that the
proper classification of late payment charges is nevertheless "al-
most a metaphysical question ...a pure question of judgment,
and probably will have to be decided by the court."'49
Commissions as well as courts do reach decisions, of course,
but those decisions involve quite diverse perceptions with both
strengths and limitations. The requirements of legal decisionmak-
ing in cases reaching determinate results upon stated grounds,
however, have led to the adoption and defense of exclusive defini-
tions of late payment charges, ignoring or rejecting other percep-
tions and conflicting lines of reasoning. An overwhelming number
of commissions and courts perceive late charges as something other
than interest.50 This attitude by the decisionmakers apparently de-
rives both from the strength of the noninterest perceptions and
from the drawbacks of characterizing late charges as interest, par-
ticularly the decisionmakers' awareness that late charges identified
as interest will likely fall within the reach of the usury statutes.
The interpretation offered here is that the late payment
charge can be perceived within different categories; that a policy
choice is necessary and implicit in the choice of any particular cat-
egory in articulating a decision; and that there are positive ele-
ments as well as deficiencies in each perception.
A. Cost Recovery and Allocation
As Coffelt, Guste, and Delich suggest, the predominant view is
that late charges function to recover and allocate costs of late pay-
ment to late payers and, therefore, are not interest.51 This view is
46. 1975 NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 3, 13, 21.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 4.
49. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, BULL. No. 24-1972
at 21 (June 12, 1972) [hereinafter cited as NARUC BULL. No. 24-1972].
50. Samuels, supra note 2, at 1160.
51. See, e.g., Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., No. 96,137-U, slip op. at 6-7 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n
Apr. 3, 1974); Consumer Standards and Billing Practices for Residential Service, slip op. at
10-11, 18 (Pa. P.U.C. Apr. 12, 1978); Utah Power & Light Co., 19 Pub. U. Rep. 2d 369 (Utah
P.S.C. 1937); Investigation to Determine the Reasonableness of Certain Practices and
Charges by Public Utilities, No. 19589, slip op. at 20 (Va. Corp. Comm'n Jan. 10, 1977);
Brief for Wisconsin Power & Light Co. at 3, Investigation on Motion of the Commission
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not inaccurate. But, although courts and commissions have per-
ceived the late charge as a simple antidiscriminatory device, there
are complicating factors. First, the relationship between collection
costs and the revenues from late charges varies with the collection
policy. Perhaps half of the utility companies do not impose charges
for late payment; and among those that do, both the amount of the
charge5" and the time over which the costs are incurred vary con-
siderably. One critical variable is the length of the due and payable
period, a factor of considerable importance because it determines
what constitutes a late payment. Although the due and payable
period may be as short as ten or fifteen days, the overwhelming
number of customers pay within one month without any collection
activity by the utility company.5s
Second, the allocation of general costs to late payment is arbi-
trary. It is often a matter of historical policy. The utility's purpose
Relative to Whether the Present Deposit, Guarantee and Disconnect Rules Are Appropriate
and Reasonable and as to Whether a Rule Should Be Promulgated Respecting Net and
Gross Billing Practices of Public Utilities, No. 2-U-7720 (Wis. P.S.C. Apr. 6, 1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Wis. Billing Practices Investigation]; Memorandum from William Anderson to
Commissioners and Commission Attorneys, North Carolina Utilities Commission at 2-6, The
"Net and Gross" Billing Practice (December 22, 1970).
52. Typically, the level of the charge is not directly related to collection activity and
costs. Answer of Kansas Gas & Electric Co. at 3, Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., No. 96,137-U.
53. Samuels, supra note 2, at 1158-59. In the case of a usury charge brought against the
water department of the City of Cleveland, the city defended its policies in part on the
ground that
[ulsury regulations were enacted to protect borrowers from extortion and unjust
oppression by unscrupulous lender [sic]. Such regulations proceed on the as-
sumption that a usurious loan is attributable to an imbalance in the relationship
between the lender and the borrower and that the borrower's plight deprives
him of the freedom to contract, placing him at the mercy of the lender . . . . It
is clear, initially, that such an inequity does not exist in the relationship between
a municipally-owned utility and its customers.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017
(Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Feb. 3, 1977). In reply, the plaintiffs characterized the
city's position as being "that, basically, the usury statute should not apply to it because the
water company is run by 'nice people,'" and commented that "malice or vindictiveness is
not an element of the offense of usury." Reply Brief to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, 4, Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017. The relevant point is that
although the court held the city's late charge not to be usurious interest, it urged the City
Council to lengthen the due and payable period because the people least able to afford the
late charge were the ones most likely to suffer. Moreover, the court criticized the billing
procedure for giving
the false impression of a discount if payment is made before the due date ex-
pires in fifteen (15) days. It is grossly misleading to the thousands of citizens of
Cuyahoga County who have a right to rely on the City of Cleveland's representa-
tions. The billing procedure of the City of Cleveland's Water Division must be
changed.
Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017, slip op. at 3.
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in allocating general costs to the late payment charge is to have
sufficient costs to offset revenues so that the utility can defend the
amount of the charge against future challenge.5 4 Utility companies
also frequently and arbitrarily allocate the specific cost of uncol-
lectible accounts to late payers generally,55 failing to distinguish
late payers from nonpayers. In addition, the companies often do
not distinguish between late payers who pay only after collection
action and those who pay on their own initiative.5 6
Third, the loss of working capital is the principal if not sole
cost to the utility of late payments during the precollection activity
period. Interest is a logical device to recover the value of that loss
and has been acknowledged as such by at least one company wit-
ness. 57 Two further complications arise. First, the effective annual
rate calculable for late payment charges is often much higher than
the actual market cost of working capital, even during periods of
relatively high market interest rates. Second, the rate base often
includes working capital, so that recovering the cost of working
capital through late payment charges may permit double recovery.
For this reason, working capital costs are sometimes excluded in
estimating late payment costs.
Finally, it is questionable whether identifying the late charge
as a method of recovering collection costs precludes its identifica-
tion as interest. After all, banks and other institutions have collec-
tion and other operating costs that do not prevent the identifica-
tion of their charges as interest. Moreover, utility collection costs
54. It should be noted that, in most cases, little if any cost information is available.
Cost figures typically are estimates inasmuch as the Uniform System of Accounts neither
requires nor permits the isolation of late payment costs.
55. Samuels, supra note 2, at 1155; 1972 NARUC REPORT, supra note 5, at 8, 10.
56. See Jones v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 222 Kan. 390, 400-02, 565 P.2d 597, 605-06
(1977); Samuels, supra note 2, at 1155-56.
It has been argued that bill collection activity is not the same thing as financing ac-
counts receivable. See Transcript of May 5, 1975 Hearing, vol. VIII, at 1016, Wis. Billing
Practices Investigation, supra note 51. It also has been argued that cost recovery is justified
only when there have been special services, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,
Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017, and that the late charge has no relation to the
actual damages suffered by the company, Memorandum of Intervenors at 1, Odell Smith, 78
Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317 (Ark. P.S.C. 1969). In an early case, the court held that a 10% late
charge was a penalty for enforcing prompt payment or indemnifying for damage suffered
from unpaid bills and that the only such damage allowed a creditor is legal interest. Ford v.
Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 102 Miss. 717, 59 So. 880 (1912), noted in Brief for the Attorney
General of Kansas as Amicus Curiae at 6, Jones v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 222 Kan. 390,
400-02, 565 P.2d 597, 605-06 (1977).
57. Brief for Complainant at 20, Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., No. 96,137-U (Kan. Corp.
Comm'n Apr. 3, 1974) (quoting Transcript at 356, 527).
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and late payment charges are for the most part independently de-
termined through separate policy decisions. 8
In conclusion, the identification of the late payment charge as
interest and its identification as a device for the recovery and allo-
cation of cost are not mutually exclusive, because the charge is for
the time-use of money. Thus, even though an emphasis on the in-
terest categorization arguably ignores the recovery of collection ex-
penses, 59 one can also argue that late payment charges constitute
both interest and a means necessary to recover costs and induce
prompt payment.0
B. Inducement to Promptness, "Penalty," and
Other Perceptions of Late Charges
Although the definition of late charges as a device for the re-
covery and allocation of cost predominates, four other perceptions
are common: the forfeited discount, the net-gross rate, the induce-
ment to prompt payment, and the penalty for late payment. One
of them is fallacious, another is an exercise in studied ambiguity,
and the other two have substantive meaning but remain controver-
sial. Confusion pervades this issue, as advocates of each perception
explicitly reject one or more of the other perceptions. One utility
spokesman, for example, has characterized the late charge not as
interest but as a penalty, while a staff member of a commission has
argued that the late charge should not be considered a penalty but
a forfeited discount.0 1
The conception of a forfeited discount is utterly fallacious.
When there are two listed prices, the lower price reflects not a dis-
count but the utility company's charge for its utility service; the
higher price reflects the addition of a charge for late payment.62
58. Samuels, supra note 2, at 1155.
59. Answer of Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. at 3, Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., No. 96,137-U.
60. See, e.g., Atlanta Gas Light Co., 17 Pub. U. Rep. 4th 421, 426 (Ga. P.S.C. 1976);
Rule-Making Proceeding to Investigate and Promulgate Rules to Prohibit and to Establish
Uniform Tariff Provisions for Billing of Customers of Electric, Telephone, Gas, Water and
Sewer Utilities, No. M-100, SUB 39, slip op. at 6 (N.C. Util. Comm'n Nov. 24, 1972) [herein-
after cited as N.C. Uniform Billing Procedure Investigation].
61. NARUC BULL. No. 24-1972, supra note 49, at 20.
62. The ambiguity of such practice was noted in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment at 5-6, Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017 (Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P.
Feb. 3, 1977):
Indeed, defendant's characterization of the late-payment charge as a 'discount'
rather than a 'penalty' is refuted by a simple reading of the ordinance which
effectuated the late payment charge. That ordinance provides, '[A111 bills . . .
not paid on or before the date shown on the bill . . . shall be increased by an
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The idea that the late charge embodies the failure to take advan-
tage of a discount is attractive to some persons and may motivate
customers to pay promptly; it is nevertheless untrue. The concept's
main historic advantage has been to improve public relations by
avoiding the antagonistic designation of late charges as penalties or
even as charges. This notion does, of course, place the moral blame
on the customer for not paying on time. The very concept of a
discount, however, may run afoul of statutory provisions that in-
struct commissions to make rules and regulations to prevent
discounts. 3
The concept of net-gross rates shares with the notion of a for-
feited discount the twin advantages of avoiding identification of
the late charge as a penalty, which utility companies find condu-
cive to the formation of a positive public image, and of avoiding
identification of the charge as interest, which utility company exec-
utives and lawyers find desirable in light of the usury statutes.
Utility companies developed the net-gross idea largely in response
to the recognition of the fallacy of forfeited discounts, but it is the
epitome of ambiguity. The customer's bill indicates a "gross"
amount and a "net" amount, with no identification of the differ-
ence between them except that the gross amount is to be paid after
the due and payable date.64 The related characterization as a "dis-
count for prompt payment" is no less fallacious than the less spe-
cific notions of a forfeited discount and a net-gross rate.6
The notions of an inducement to prompt payment and a pen-
alty for late payment more accurately characterize the nature of a
late payment charge, because irrespective of how the charge is la-
beled, it is likely to motivate prompt payment and to be perceived
as a penalty by the customer. The categorization as an inducement
to prompt payment is controversial. The plaintiffs in one usury
case argued that "the creation of incentive for prompt payment
has never been recognized as a justification for imposition of exor-
bitant and usurious interest rates."66 Intervenors challenging a net-
amount equal to three per cent (3%) of the bill.' Cleveland City Ordinances,
Section 7.2112 (emphasis added). The impact of the ordinance is clear: it exacts
a penalty for late payment of bills.
63. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-140(b)(2) (1975).
64. In some cases, the official tariffs on file at commission offices may speak of a late
charge, penalty, or other term, but the bill rendered to customers merely lists net and gross
amounts.
65. See 1975 NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 18. But see Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Napoletano, 277 A.D. 441, 444, 101 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59-60 (1950).
66. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Benham v. City of Cleveland, No.
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gross billing system in Arkansas quoted from a dissent by Justice
Frankfurter: "[e]xactions for a breach of contract not giving rise to
damages and merely serving as added pressure to carry out punc-
tiliously the terms of a contract, are not enforced by the courts. '67
The intervenors added that although Justice Frankfurter ex-
pressed this view "in a dissent, it voices a generally held view that
the providing of 'incentives' for prompt payment of debts should
not be left up to private individuals or corporations."68 Conversely,
many utilities defend net-gross billing systems and favor the impo-
sition of penalties and the allowance of discounts to secure the
prompt payment of utility bills."
The attempt to justify late charges as a penalty is also contro-
versial. Critics of late payment charges, for example, tend to char-
acterize them as an inequitable punishment for poverty. Utilities,
on the other hand, argue that late payment charges are not interest
but a legal penalty for delinquency.1 One company representative
testified that the late charges are but a penalty for violating the
terms under which service is provided. 2 This latter argument is a
914,017.
67. Memorandum of Intervenors at 4, Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317 (Ark. P.S.C.
1969) (quoting Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 417-18 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
68. Id. Perhaps less significant than the dissent origin of the quotation from Justice
Frankfurter is the fact that the object of attack was company tariff provisions previously
approved by the state commission, lending to them the color of state action.
69. See, e.g., Brief for Wisconsin Power & Light Co. at 3, Wis. Billing Practices Investi-
gation, supra note 51.
70. In Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317 (Ark. P.S.C. 1969), a group of welfare recip-
ients intervened in the Arkansas Public Service Commission's investigation of the petition
by Arkansas Power & Light Co. for the imposition of a Gross-Net Billing Rider. The inter-
venors argued in part that the proposed late payment charge, or "penalty," could not be
equitably justified, because late payment is "frequently a matter of hardship and involun-
tary delinquency." Memorandum of Intervenors at 4, Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317.
In support of their argument, they noted that the welfare allowance for public utility
charges is frequently less than what the recipient needs, and that the recipient receives the
welfare check two weeks before the utility bill arrives. Id. at 4-5. The intervenors claimed
that "[gliven an already acute money shortage in these families, and the resulting inability
to put aside an unknown amount of cash for two weeks to cover the utility bill,. . . welfare
recipients will frequently be made to pay the requested penalty through no fault of their
own . . . . Id. at 5.
When the poor and the elderly on fixed incomes do not pay their utility bills on time, it
is often because of unemployment and poverty, not because of lack of incentive. Samuels,
supra note 2, at 1159-60.
71. Memorandum Brief at 13-15, Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317 (Ark. P.S.C.
1969).
72. Transcript of May 5, 1975 Hearing, vol. VIII, at 1095, Wis. Billing Practices Investi-
gation, supra note 51. A Wisconsin Gas Company representative stated that "[t]he bill is
unconditionally due on the due date" and "[t]he company does not permit late payments."
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non sequitur, since the late charge-or penalty-is one of the
terms under which service is provided. 78
However one characterizes late payment charges, the use of
certain terms and not others is not necessarily dispositive of the
"real nature" of the transaction. Thus, statements such as "[t]he
existence of prompt payment discounts or late payment penalties
may be taken as evidence of a desire to collect as promptly as pos-
sible, rather than to levy a charge for credit," merely beg the is-
sue. This is precisely the point: Because public relations symbolism
and semantics have little bearing on the substance of the transac-
tion, the identification of late payment charges under one category
does not preclude identification under others, including that of in-
terest. Although the categories are self-justifying, and the decisions
resting on specific categories are tautological, the differing percep-
tions still co-exist. The bogey, of course, is the interest category, on
which the discussion will now focus.
C. Interest
Despite the overwhelming tendency of courts and commissions
not to perceive late payment charges as interest, the factors and
lines of reasoning they consider are diverse, often ambiguous, and
sometimes internally conflicting. The recurring themes in any dis-
cussion of the nature of late payment charges include: late pay-
ment as a charge for the extension of credit; the conflict between
the time-price and the time-use doctrines; the existence of forbear-
ance in the late-charge system; the significance of the recurring or
nonrecurring nature of the charge; and the argument that nonpay-
ment, and thus exposure to the late charge, is within the control of
the payor. In light of these diverse themes, both the identification
of late charges as interest and the rejection of such an identifica-
tion are at best subject to serious qualifications and require the
exercise of arbitrary or partisan choice.
Id. It follows, according to such reasoning, that a revolving charge or installment plan can-
not be considered a term within the service agreement offered to customers.
73. Late payment charges can also be analogized to liquidated damages clauses, which
are void and unenforceable unless related to the actual damage suffered. See Memorandum
of Intervenors at 4, Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317 (Ark. P.S.C. 1969). In Smith, the
intervenors concluded that the late charge (ten percent of the first $15.00 of the bill, two
percent of the excess) was regressive and unrelated to the costs created by late payment. Id.
at 2, 5.
74. 1975 NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
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1. CHARGE FOR THE EXTENSION OF CREDIT
The specific substantive arguments against regarding late pay-
ment charges as interest are: (1) that there is no extension of
credit, no loan, no specific payment for the use of money, no bill in
the sense contemplated by the usury law; (2) that utility compa-
nies do not desire to extend credit; and (3) that such charges are
the equivalent of a time-price differential and thus are not interest.
Each of these arguments, on which the majority of rulings have
been based, has been either compromised by statements and deci-
sions to the contrary or severely weakened by countervailing lines
of reasoning.
One recent example is the case of Jones v. Kansas Gas &
Electric Co.75 At the agency level, the Kansas Corporation Com-
mission found that "the late payment charges do not constitute
payment for the extension of credit. . . . It follows, and the Com-
mission so finds, that the late payment charges do not constitute
interest ... ,, On appeal from a district court order affirming the
decision of the Commission, the Supreme Court of Kansas agreed
in part with the Commission and held that the late payment
charges were not interest but penalty charges to induce prompt
payment and defray collection costs. The court noted, however,
that in testimony before the Commission a company witness re-
ferred to the late payment charge as an extension of credit.77 The
court concluded that since the utility did not incur any collection
costs during the fifteen-day grace period for late payment charges,
"[t]he penalty. . . should be limited to an amount which encour-
ages prompt payment and covers the cost of extending credit."78
This result, of course, is totally inconsistent with the court's hold-
ing that late payment charges do not constitute interest payments
if one includes in the definition of interest the notion of a charge
for the extension of credit.
The Jones decision is not the sole illustration of the inherent
compromises and ambiguities in reasoning that surround the issue
of whether late payment charges involve an extension of credit.
The 1972 NARUC Ad Hoc Committee on Billing Practices stated
that a late payment charge is a credit or finance charge.79 The
75. 222 Kan. 390, 565 P.2d 597 (1977).
76. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., No. 96,137-U, slip op. at 6 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n Apr. 3,
1974).
77. 222 Kan. at 395, 565 P.2d at 602.
78. Id. at 401-02, 565 P.2d at 606 (emphasis added).
79. 1972 NARUC REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
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North Carolina Utilities Commission adopted a one percent per
month maximum rate as a charge for the extension of credit and
found "late payment charges," "finance charges," and "service
charges" synonymous with "interest." 80 An Iowa lower court wrote
of a "delayed payment charge," 81 and the staff of the New York
Public Service Commission referred to late payment charges as an
extension of credit.82 Also, various plaintiffs and intervenors have
attacked utility late payment charges in terms of credit extension"
and credit sales contracts.8 4 Conversely, several recent decisions
have held that late charges are not interest, asserting that a late
charge is not a payment for the use of money in the sense of a
loan, as distinguished from a credit sale. 5 In at least one case, a
commission determined that the late charge constituted neither a
loan, nor the use of money, nor a credit sale, nor the extension of
credit.8 6
Are utility companies extending credit when they assess late
charges? Utility spokesmen arguing against characterization as in-
terest often deny that their business involves credit extension.
When arguing for the approval of late charges, however, they often
call attention to the credit extended during the month of service
before billing and during the period between the billing date and
the due and payable date. The 1975 NARUC Report emphasized
inducement to promptness and rejected the credit-charge concept;
nonetheless, the report referred to the late charge as a charge "for
the use of funds. 8 7 The New York Commission has gone so far as
80. N.C. Uniform Billing Procedure Investigation, supra note 60, at 6, 8.
81. State ex rel. Turner v. Town of LeGrand, No. 32857, slip op. at 5 (Iowa Marshall
County Dist. Ct. Jan. 3, 1978).
82. Energy Division Staff Memorandum to the New York Public Service Commission,
at 15 (Apr. 26, 1974).
83. Brief for Joint Petitioners at 4, Peoples' Counsel & Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., No.
7163 (Md. P.S.C., brief filed Jan. 29, 1979).
84. Memorandum of Intervenors at 4, Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317 (Ark. P.S.C.
1969).
85. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Chattanooga Elec. Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787, 790 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974).
Late charges can be defended against usury attack by two parallel arguments. One can
argue that the charges are not interest either because there is no extension of credit, or
because there is no loan. The distinction between a credit sale and a loan, and the question
whether the nature of the charge for extended credit is the same for each, are key issues.
But both forms of the use of money (credit extensions and loans) have been the definitional
bases of both rejections and acceptances of the late charge as interest.
86. Consumer Standards and Billing Practices for Residential Service, slip op. at 10-11
(Pa. P.U.C. Apr. 12, 1978).
87. 1975 NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
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to conclude that, "[i]n essence, customers making late payments
are receiving loans from the company ..8.8. In other words, al-
though some authorities refuse to identify late charges as interest
on the ground that they involve neither an extension of credit, nor
the use of money, nor a loan, other authorities have identified late
charges as interest on precisely those grounds.
A related line of reasoning is that late charges are not interest
subject to usury limitations because utility bills are not "bills" in
the sense contemplated by the usury statutes, which are inapplica-
ble to sales of services or products. One Ohio court held that the
state statutes "limiting the rate of interest on bills do not use the
term 'bill' in the sense of notices sent out on amounts owed for
services rendered or products delivered, but only in the sense of an
instrument of writing for the forebearance [sic] of payment of
money at any future time."' 9 The relevant Ohio statute reads, in
pertinent part:
[W]hen money becomes due and payable upon any bond, bill,
note or other instrument of writing, upon any book account, or
settlement between parties upon all verbal contracts entered
into, and upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial
tribunal for the payment of money arising out of a contract, or
other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at a rate of
six percent per annum, and no more.90
On the basis of this provision, the defendant utility argued that
the city's billing procedure, especially its late charge provision, was
not specifically enumerated and therefore was not within the ambit
of the usury statute. 1 In response, the plaintiff suggested that the
very language of that section, notably "when money becomes due
and payable, upon any. . . book account," sufficed to bring a util-
ity bill within the statute.2 Similarly, apropos of Jones,9 3 the Kan-
sas usury statute includes such language as "for money lent or
money due on settlement of account" and "for payment due and
withheld by an unreasonable and vexatious delay of payment or
88. Memorandum Approving Late Payment Charge at 5, Long Island Lighting Co., No.
27237 (N.Y. P.S.C. Sept. 14, 1977).
89. Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017, slip op. at 2-3 (Ohio Cuyahoga County
Ct. C.P. Feb. 3, 1977).
90. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.02 (Page 1979).
91. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-5, Benham v. City of Cleveland,
No. 914,017.
92. Reply Brief to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Benham v. City of
Cleveland, No. 914,017.
93. 222 Kan: 390, 565 P.2d 597 (1977).
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settlement of accounts."9 ' Thus, even though utility bills are gener-
ally excluded from usury statutes, some consumers have persua-
sively stressed the prima facie applicability of the usury limitations
to utility bills and charges for late payment by analogizing these
charges to amounts due on accounts and to charges for credit. 5
For comparison, note that the Internal Revenue Service treats
late payment charges of public utility companies as interest pay-
ments deductible for the customer." For tax deduction purposes,
interest is compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for
the use, forbearance, or detention of money.97 Under the Internal
Revenue Code, "it is not necessary for the parties to a transaction
to label a payment made for the use of money as interest for it to
be so treated. The facts of the transaction control its character, not
the terminology. '" 8 Moreover, "[tihe fact that the late-payment
charge is a one-time charge does not preclude a finding that it is
interest."99 Finally, late charges are deductible as interest pay-
ments regardless of their use by the recipient to cover operating
costs. 00
One reason why utilities do not perceive late payment charges
as interest payments is that they do not see themselves as financial
institutions. Utility representatives frequently argue that they
have no desire to extend credit, that they are not in the loan or
finance business, and that they do not use credit as a marketing
tool.10 1 Analytically, the situation is more complex. The utility has
made no prior payment to the customer, the repayment of which
has been delayed, but prior delivery and consumption of utility
services have taken place, and amounts on accounts are due, if not
overdue. Alongside the cases of welfare families unable to pay
94. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-201 (1974).
95. See, e.g., Memorandum Approving Late Payment Charge, Long Island Lighting Co.,
No. 27237 (N.Y. P.S.C. Sept. 14, 1977); 1972 NARUC REPORT, supra note 5.
96. See generally Brief for Wisconsin Department of Justice at 4, Wis. Billing Practices
Investigation, supra note 51; see also Transcript of Hearing at 464-67, Investigation by the
Commission of Gas and Electric Tariffs Relative to (a) Waiver of Late Payment Charge
After Due Date, (b) Amount, or Percentage, of Late Payment Charge, and (c) Customer
Deposit Requirements, No. 6785 (Md. P.S.C., hearing on July 17, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Md. Late Payment Charge Investigation].
97. Fall River Elec. Light Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 168 (1931).
98. Rev. Rul. 72-315, 1972-1 C.B. 49, 50.
99. Rev. Rul. 74-187, 1974-1 C.B. 48.
100. [1979] STAND. FED. TAX REp. (CCH) 1420.103; see 1979 U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE
(CCH) § 1071.
101. Brief for Wisconsin Gas Co. at 4-5, Wis. Billing Practices Investigation, supra note
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monthly bills on time are the small businesses that finance their
own working capital by paying the relatively low rates of late
charges and thus avoid more expensive alternatives. Because the
utility company has the option of disconnecting service immedi-
ately upon delinquency, the use of late charges as an intermediate
step prior to disconnection indicates an institutional decision to
permit late payment at a price, at least up to a point. Indeed, dis-
connections are relatively few in comparison to the percentage of
delinquences and total customers. Insofar as the question of usury
is concerned, the nebulous distinctions variously between a loan,
an extension of credit, and a nonpayment of an amount owed are
influenced by further distinctions between "financial" and "nonfi-
nancial" institutions. The general demise of standard usury limits
on finance charges of all types, however, largely eclipses such dis-
tinctions and considerations.
2. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TIME-PRICE AND THE TIME-USE
DOCTRINES
The time-price doctrine has rationalized the exclusion of a
wide range of transactions from the reach of usury statutes. Under
the time-price doctrine the seller may charge a credit price that is
higher than the cash price. The credit price is the cash price plus
the time-price differential. Typically, the time-price differential is
regulated by other statutes that permit effective rates well in ex-
cess of the legal rate of interest allowed by the usury statutes.
It is implicit in the time-price doctrine that the extra amount
charged is correlated with the passage of time. Whenever a differ-
ential amount of money is correlated with some measure of time,
that differential is interest in the eye of the economist. Whenever a
charge involves payment over time, it is interest. This is the time-
use nature of interest, independent of whether there is a loan, an
extension of credit, or a delayed payment for an amount due.
The necessary implication of this economic view of the time-
price differential is that the adoption of the time-price doctrine
excludes certain transactions from the reach of the usury statute.
When a court holds that the time-price differential is not interest,
it gives effect to a normative judgment to exclude these types of
transactions. Such a holding is not based on the analytical or eco-
nomic nature of interest0 2 as given by the time-use analysis. It fol-
102. Thus, the distinction drawn by the appellate court in State ex rel. Guste v. Coun-
cil of New Orleans, 297 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd, 309 So. 2d 290 (La. 1975), is
19801
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
lows that plaintiffs who rely on the time-use analysis to assert that
late charges are interest employ a limited argument. The legal
treatment of late charges vis-a-vis the usury statute confronts an
ought question. Because an ought cannot be deduced from an is,
then even assuming the is status of the time-use analysis, legal
decisionmaking still requires an additional normative premise,
such as that provided by the time-price doctrine, which, unfortu-
nately perhaps, leads to the opposite conclusion.
3. FORBEARANCE
The notion of forbearance figures prominently in the identifi-
cation of late payment charges as interest. As with the issue of
whether late payment charges involve an extension of credit, the
question of forbearance evidences diverse and conflicting lines of
reasoning. For the most part, decisions that find neither a loan nor
an extension of credit in late-charge systems also find no forbear-
ance from collection of a debt. This was the result in Coffelt v.
Arkansas Power & Light Co., 08 as well as that of the Kansas Cor-
poration Commission in Kansas Gas & Electric Co.104
The argument that late-charge billing systems are not usurious
because they do not involve forbearance is superficially consistent
with the general definition of usury. Black's Law Dictionary de-
fines usury as an "illegal contract for a loan or forbearance of
money, goods, or things in action, by which illegal interest is re-
served ' ' 10 5 and the taking, either directly or indirectly, of "a greater
sum for the use of money than the lawful interest."'1 6 Although
Black's notes that usury is the forbearance of a loan or of an ex-
isting indebtedness, at least one city has successfully defended a
late-payment usury charge on the ground that forbearance applies
only to a loan of money.107 Another court, however, held that
[wihen time is given to pay ... an amount ... greater than the
cash price with legal interest, the result is an agreement for for-
without analytical foundation. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
103. 248 Ark. 313, 316-17, 451 S.W.2d 881, 883-84 (1970). Similarly, in Ferguson v.
Chattanooga Elec. Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), the court held that the
late charge was neither a payment for the use of money nor consideration for the creditor's
forbearance. Id. at 790.
104. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., No. 96,137-U, slip op. at 6 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n Apr. 3,
1974).
105. BLACK'S LAW DicTiONARY 1714 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
106. Id.
107. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6, Benham v. City of Cleveland,
No. 914,017 (Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Feb. 3, 1977).
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bearance from demanding payment of an existing debt ....
Forbearance does not necessarily require an actual loan of
money. It generally signifies the giving of time for the payment
of a debt. In any transaction in which there is delay until final
payment there is a forbearance as that term is used in the re-
quirement for a finding of usury.108
If, consistent with this opinion and Black's, one defines forbear-
ance as an "[a]ct by which [a] creditor waits for payment of [a]
debt due him by [the] debtor after it becomes due,"'' 09 then for-
bearance also applies to debts arising from transactions other than
loans. Irrespective of which definition applies, however, courts and
commissions may not find forbearance if they perceive the late
payment charge as a method of recovering costs or inducing
prompt payment.
The question of forbearance is involved analytically in the
identification of late charges as interest. For late charges to be usu-
rious, they must first be considered interest. One test of interest is
forbearance."10 The immediate operative question, then, is whether
forbearance is present. The answer seems to turn on the interpre-
tation given to the billing and collection system as a whole, of
which late charges are a part. This interpretation is a function of
some combination of company and commission policy. One can ar-
gue, therefore, that there is no specific act of forbearance, since
delay of further company collection activity is built into the sys-
tem. One can also argue, however, that the built-in delay per se
constitutes forbearance insofar as imposition and payment of late
charges postpone the utility's "most effective collection tech-
nique,""' namely, disconnection. In addition, one can argue that
there is forbearance of the legal option available to the company to
bring suit in small claims court and perhaps even to perfect a lien
on the customer's property." 2 One court has reasoned that
[e]ven the name used by the Ordinance [permitting late charges]
108. State ex rel. Tuiner v. Younker Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550, 562 (Iowa 1973).
109. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1714 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
110. In Benham, the court stated that the usury statute does "not use the term 'bill' in
the sense of notices sent out on amounts owed for services rendered or products delivered,
but only in the sense of an instrument of writing for the forbearance of payment of money
at any future time." No. 914,017, slip op. at 2-3. The court held the statute did not apply to
the city's late charge.
111. State ex rel. Turner v. Town of LeGrand, No. 32857, slip op. at 5 (Iowa Marshall
County Dist. Ct. Jan. 3, 1978).
112. Brief of Joint Petitioners at 16, People's Counsel & Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., No.
7163 (Md. P.S.C., brief filed Jan. 29, 1979).
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itself is indicative of the forbearance inherent in the system.
The Ordinance doesn't call it a "late payment charge," it calls it
a "delayed payment charge." The clear implication is that a cus-
tomer may "delay" his payment by paying the 10% fee for so
"delaying."""8
This court viewed the city's policy decision to include a late charge
in its billing and collection system as constituting by itself a deci-
sion to delay and forbear.
Thus, there is obvious disagreement and confusion over the
nature and reach of the forbearance requirement. Both the law and
the facts on forbearance in late payment charges permit diverse
and conflicting perceptions, lines of reasoning, and conclusions.
4. NONRECURRING AND RECURRING LATE CHARGES
Another line of reasoning for finding that late charges are not
interest is that late charges are nonrecurring and therefore inde-
pendent of the specific length of time during which payment is
delayed. The charge is imposed but once and does not increase
with the passage of time."" It has been argued, however, that a
nonrecurring late charge is interest because of forbearance, not-
withstanding its invariability with time.11 5
More important for this discussion are the alternative ratio-
nales underlying the view that nonrecurring charges are not inter-
est. First, there is the implication that if a nonrecurring charge is
not interest, a recurring charge is interest. Indeed, commissions
that adopt recurring late charges are more receptive to the idea
that late charges are interest.116 Second, the implication that a re-
curring late charge is interest leads to the notion that a recurring
charge is desirable; this notion is also supported by the recognition
of the continuity and accumulation of working capital costs, which
113. State ex rel. Turner v. Town of LeGrand, No. 32857, slip op. at 5. The same impli-
cation appears to follow from the term "late payment charge."
114. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Benham v. City of Cleveland,
No. 914,017 (Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Feb. 3, 1977). "[O]nly the computations of
effective interest," rather than "[tihe time of the payment after the due date," "determine
the amount to be paid .... [T]hough computations may create an effective rate of interest,
the late charge, itself, is not legal interest, because the amount due does not increase as time
passes." Id., slip op. at 2. See also 1975 NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 3, 13-14, 21.
115. Reply Brief to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, 7, Benham v.
City of Cleveland, No. 914,017.
116. E.g., State ex rel. Guste v. Council of New Orleans, 309 So. 2d 290 (La. 1975);
Rangeley Power Co., 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th 289 (Me. P.U.C. 1975); N.C. Uniform Billing Proce-
dure Investigation, supra note 60.
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are clearly interest. Conversely, the view that the late charge is not
intended to be interest implies that the late charge should be col-
lected only once.1 17
Utility billing and collection systems actually include late
charges that are both recurring and nonrecurring. In this context,
the perception that late charges are interest may justify a recurring
or time-differentiated late charge, whereas the imposition of a non-
recurring late charge may lead to the perception that late charges
are not interest-a circular approach at best. The perception that
late charges are not interest may lead utilities to impose a non-
recurring late charge, and the practice can logically serve as
"proof" that there is no interest either intended or actual. Con-
versely, the perception of late charges as interest may lead to the
imposition of a recurring charge with the effect that the practice
can serve as proof that they are interest. Whatever the require-
ments of logic, the predominant holdings seem to say that a non-
recurring late charge is not interest.
5. CONSUMER CONTROL
A final line of reasoning used to argue that late charges are not
interest is that payment of the late charge is within the control of
the payor who, presumably, could pay by or on the due date.1 s
Although no decision appears to have turned on this argument,
three points merit discussion. First, at issue is the nature of the
system, not the consumer's options. Even though incurring an obli-
gation to pay interest is always within the control of the payor,
that factor alone does not conclusively rebut the interest identifi-
cation and usury allegation. Second, the customer's delay does re-
duce the effective rate of interest in the case of the nonrecurring
charge, because the fiat-rate single charge applies to an increasing
period of time.1 9 Third, the very lessening of the effective rate of
interest implies that the nonrecurrence of the charge is dysfunc-
tional in pressuring the customer to delay payment no further. 2 '
117. Written comments by Arkansas Consumer Research Regarding Issues Raised by
the Commission's October 1977 Order at 11, Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Util-
ity Service, No. U-2888 (Ark. P.S.C., comments dated Jan. 20, 1978); W. VA. PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, RULES & REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF WATER UTILITIES Rule 403.3
(1977).
118. Memorandum Brief at 13, 15, Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317 (Ark. P.S.C.
1969); Transcript of Proceedings at 24-26, Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017 (Ohio
Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Feb. 3, 1977).
119. Samuels, supra note 2, at 1156-57.
120. Direct Testimony and Exhibits of Dr. Frederick J. Wells, Appendix D to Coin-
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To argue, therefore, that the late charge is not interest because it
is within the control of the payor emphasizes the customer's ability
not only to avoid any late charge but also, by calculated delay, to
take advantage of the nonrecurring nature of the charge. Thus, this
argument indirectly and ironically makes the dysfunctional charac-
ter of a nonrecurring late charge as an inducement to prompt pay-
ment a ground for not identifying the late charge as interest.
D. Interest and Usury
The predominant course of commission and court decisions
has been to assert cost-recovery-and-allocation and promptness-in-
ducement theories and to deny extension-of-credit, use-of-money,
and forbearance arguments. 12 1 A number of decisions, however,
have found late payment charges to be interest. Two recent lower
courts, moreover, in addition to the court of appeals in Guste, went
one step further and found late payment charges to be usurious.1 22
It is not surprising that private plaintiffs identify late charges
as usurious interest in cases brought specifically on usury
grounds,'12 but several state officials, including the state attorney
general in Guste,124 the attorney generals of Kansas 25 and Iowa, 26
plaint, Sabur v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (11. Corn. Comm'n, filed June 28, 1974); Samu-
els, supra note 2, at 1155-56.
121. See cases cited note 109 supra. See also 1972 NARUC REPORT, supra note 5. In
Rangeley, the Maine Commission held an eighteen percent per annum rate less appropriate
than one percent per month. Also noteworthy is the Commission's condemnation of the
company's extending interest-free loans to the owner and to other companies owned by him
while the company was having financial difficulties. 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th at 299.
Another argument that late charges are not interest, and therefore not usurious, is that
payment of the late charge is within the control of the payor who, presumably, could pay by
or on the due date. Memorandum Brief at 13, 15, Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317 (Ark.
P.S.C. 1969); Transcript of Proceedings at 24-26, Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017.
It appears that the utility in Guste also made this argument. 297 So. 2d at 524. No deci-
sions, however, appear to have turned on this argument.
Almost all recent usury cases have involved high nonrecurring rates; an exception is
State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. North Carolina Consumers Council, Inc., 18 N.C. App. 717,
198 S.E.2d 98 (1973) (the court followed Coffelt and upheld the North Carolina Commis-
sion's charge of one percent per month after a 25-day due and payable period).
122. State ex rel. Turner v. Town of LeGrand, No. 32857 (Iowa Marshall County Dist.
Ct. Jan. 3, 1978); State v. City of Altoona, No. CE-7-3671 (Iowa Polk County Dist. Ct. 1977),
rev'd, 274 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1979).
123. See, e.g., Memorandum of Intervenors at 3, Odell Smith, 78 Pub. U. Rep. 3d 317
(Ark. P.S.C. 1969); Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Benham v. City of Cleve-
land, No. 914,017.
124. 297 So. 2d 518 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
125. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., No. 96, 137-U (Kan. Corp. Comm'n Apr. 3, 1974).
126. State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973). See also 1975
NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 17, 24.
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and the Wisconsin Department of Justice,'27 also have argued that
late charges constitute interest and are usurious. The 1972
NARUC Ad Hoc Committee Report stressed the interest nature of
the late payment charge, despite not concluding that such a charge
may be usurious.'2 8 One court acknowledged that "computations
may create an effective rate of interest,"' 2 9 although it refused to
hold that late charges constituted legal interest. In a rulemaking
decision, however, the Utah Commission not only required that
late charges be expressed in annual percentage rates, but also re-
ferred to the late charges as finance charges.'3 0 Other commissions
in Georgia,'' North Carolina, 13 2 New York, 138 Connecticut,' 3  and
Maine'35 went even further and specifically identified late charges
as interest.
Finally, in two separate actions, two Iowa district courts ruled
that the late charges of two municipal utilities violated the usury
statute.' In one, the court found that since anyone could assert a
wish not to extend credit, such a defense would only permit
"wholesale evasion of the Usury Statute," and that forbearance
was present within the meaning of that statute. 3 7 It is important
to note that the Iowa Supreme Court had previously negated the
127. Brief of the Wisconsin Department of Justice, Wis. Billing Practices Investigation,
supra note 51.
128. 1972 NARUC REPORT, supra note 5.
129. Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017, slip op. at 2.
130. Proposed Residential Utility Service Regulations, in re the Adoption and Promul-
gation of Rules, Regulations and Standards of Service for Public Utilities Relating to Ter-
mination of Service for Non-Payment, Security Deposits, Billing Procedures, Complaints,
and Information, No. A67-05-32 (Utah P.S.C.).
131. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 17 Pub. U. Rep. 4th 421 (Ga. P.S.C. 1976).
132. N.C. Uniform Billing Procedure Investigation, supra note 60.
133. Memorandum Approving Late Payment Charge, Long Island Lighting Co., No.
27237 (N.Y. P.S.C. Sept. 14, 1977).
134. Hartford Elec. Light Co., No. 11553 (Conn. P.U.C. Oct. 7, 1974) (approving 1%
per month late payment charge for nonresidential customers); Hartford Elec. Light Co., No.
760605 (Conn. P.U.C. Dec. 22, 1976) (terminating late payment charge applicable to com-
mercial and industrial customers); Hartford Elec. Light Co., No. 770320 (Conn. P.U.C. Oct.
25, 1977) (reinstating late payment charge for commercial and industrial customers). The
same sequence characterizes commission decisions in Connecticut Light & Power Co., No.
11552 (Conn. P.U.C. Oct. 7, 1974); Connecticut Light & Power Co., No. 760604 (Conn.
P.U.C. Dec. 22, 1976); Connecticut Light & Power Co., No. 770319 (Conn. P.U.C. Oct. 25,
1977). See also Southern Conn. Gas Co., No. 11731 (Conn. P.U.C. Nov. 28, 1975) (approving
1% per month late payment charge).
135. Central Maine Power Co., 8 Pub. U. Rep. 4th 277 (Me. P.U.C. 1975).
136. State ex rel. Turner v. Town of LeGrand, No. 32857 (Iowa Marshall County Dist.
Ct. Jan. 3, 1978); State v. City of Altoona, No. CE-7-3671 (Iowa Polk County- Dist. Ct. 1977),
rev'd, 274 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1979).
137. State v. City of Altoona, No. CE-7-3671, slip op. at 5.
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time-price doctrine for retail sales. 38
IV. THE QUESTION OF STATUTORY EXEMPTION: POLITICS AND
POLICY
The two Iowa district court cases discussed in the preceding
paragraph arose from a somewhat anomalous situation. Chapter
537 of the Iowa Consumer Credit Code specifically exempts late
payment charges from its eighteen percent per annum ceiling.3 9
Such charges, however, are not explicitly exempted from the nine
percent per annum ceiling imposed by the usury statute, chapter
535 .140 The differing treatments in chapters 535 and 537 permitted
the specific holdings.' The anomaly, which perhaps accounts for
the unusual findings of usury in the Iowa cases, better illustrates
the more general result, in which reliance upon one or another
statutory exemption prevents a finding of usury.
Courts and commissions can avoid applying interest and credit
rate ceilings to utility late payment charges by finding the late
charges specifically exempted by statute. For example, public utili-
ties are free from the restrictions of the Federal Truth in Lending
Act because the Act specifically excludes "[t]ransactions under
public utility tariffs, if . . . a State regulatory body regulates the
charges for the public utility services involved [and] the charges
for delayed payment . .. ., The Johnson Act withdraws federal
court jurisdiction from cases involving state orders affecting public
utility rates.""
On the state level, some courts and commissions approach the
usury issue in public utility late payment charges by looking to the
relation of laws regulating interest and credit terms to public util-
ity regulation in general. A Connecticut court, for example, ruled
that the state truth in lending act "expressly exempts 'charges for
delayed payment and any discount allowed for early payment'
under utility rate schedules regulated by a state agency.""', In
138. State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973).
139. IOWA CODE § 537.1202(3) (1975).
140. Id. § 535.4 (1975).
141. Letter from Maurice Van Nostrand, Chairman of the Iowa State Commerce Com-
mission, to Dr. Warren J. Samuels (Feb. 13, 1978).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(4) (1976); see Ferguson v. Electric Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787,
790 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976); see Tennyson v. Gas Serv. Co., 506 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th
Cir. 1974) (court held Johnson Act removed the district court's jurisdiction over an action
challenging the legality of a utility late payment charge) (alternative holding).
144. City of Hartford v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., No. 112008, slip op. at 19 (Conn.
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State ex rel. Guste v. Council of New Orleans, the Supreme Court
of Louisiana pointed out that the usury laws apply to loans, not to
consumer credit sales, that the latter are governed by the state's
consumer credit law, and that the consumer credit law exempts
public utility rates regulated by other means. 145 In Jones v. Kansas
Gas & Electric Co.,' 4 1 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that
since public utilities were regulated by state agencies vested with
"the authority to supervise operation of the utility, subject to judi-
cial review of the reasonableness of the rate,"'4 7 public utility late
payment charges were exempt from the restrictions of the Kansas
Uniform Consumer Credit Code.'48
Similarly, the Wisconsin Power & Light Company argued
before the Wisconsin Public Service Comission that the Wisconsin
Consumer Act specifically exempts from the scope of the Act
"[c]harges for delayed payment and any discount allowed for early
payment in transactions under public utility or common carrier
tariffs if a subdivision or agency of this state or of the United
States regulates such charges or discounts.' ' 49 In reply to that de-
fense, the Wisconsin Department of Justice argued that:
[i]t is true that the United States Congress and the Wisconsin
Legislature have excluded public utility late payment charges
from the application of Truth in Lending ... and the Wiscon-
sin Consumer Act . . ., but only if such charges are otherwise
regulated by a governmental agency. The inference is clear that
if the Public Service Commission does not intend to regulate the
late payment charges of the public utilities, such charges will
come within the purview of the laws which generally regulate
the extension of consumer credit. Moreover, the applicability of
Chapter [sic] 138, Wis. Stat., entitled Money and Rates of Inter-
Hartford County Ct. C.P. Mar. 29, 1976).
145. 309 So. 2d 290, 296 (La. 1975). The reasoning that late charges are excluded from
the reach of statutes that otherwise would control them parallels the argument that com-
pany tariffs for late payment charges approved by regulatory commission rules are thereby
exempt from other control. Thus, regulation per se prevents the utility from receiving
greater profit than allowed by law, thereby negating the charge of usury. Id. The more gen-
eral reasoning is that late charge provisions are within the category of regulated rates and
therefore are not legal interest. Ferguson v. Electric Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787, 789-90
(E.D. Tenn. 1974); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Napoletano, 277 A.D. 441, 101
N.Y.S.2d 57 (1950); Delich v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 9 Pub. U. Rep. 335, 341-42
(Iowa Com. Comm'n 1975).
146. 222 Kan. 390, 565 P.2d 597 (1977).
147. Id. at 397, 565 P.2d at 604.
148. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-1-101 to -9-102 (1974 & Supp. 1979).
149. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 421.202(3) (West 1974) (amended 1975), quoted in Brief for
Wisconsin Power and Light Co. at 2, Wis. Billing Practices Investigation, supra note 51.
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est, to public utility net-gross charges remains an open and un-
resolved question.""0
But the Wisconsin Public Service Commission ignored this argu-
ment in its decision. 15 1
The debate over the nature of late payment charges also raises
a question about the relationship between municipal and state au-
thority. In the Iowa cases, one district court stated that it opposed
repeal of the usury statute by implication and that "[t]here seems
nothing intrinsic in the grant of power over rates to the defendant
City of Altoona, including late charges, as to require the partial
nullification of the Usury Statute which has general application to
all contracts, unless otherwise excepted by statute."' 52 The other
Iowa district court emphasized that the authority of the city was
not superior to that of the state.1 " In Benham v. City of Cleve-
land,154 the court ignored the issue, even though it was elaborately
debated in the briefs. The plaintiff argued that city authority in
the area of utility regulation was subject to the general regulatory
measures of the state under its police power. One of those regula-
tory measures was the usury statute. 5 5 The attorney for the defen-
dant City of Cleveland argued the opposite view:
[A] municipal corporation is free to operate [a utility] without
restrictions or qualifications by the General Assembly.
If the usury statute were held applicable to the billing pro-
cedure, the effect of such applicability would be that the Gen-
eral Assembly would be preempting a municipality in a determi-
nation as to how that municipality can best further a very
important interest." 6
Case law evidences the ability of the federal and state statu-
150. Brief for the Wisconsin Department of Justice at 5, Wis. Billing Practices Investi-
gation, supra note 51.
151. Wis. Billing Practices Investigation, supra note 51.
152. State v. City of Altoona, No. CE-7-3671, slip op. at 7 (Iowa Polk County Dist. Ct.
1977), rev'd, 274 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1979).
153. State ex rel. Turner v. Town of LeGrand, No. 32857 (Iowa Marshall County Dist.
Ct. Jan. 3,1978).
154. No. 914,017 (Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. C.P. Feb. 3, 1977).
A short time earlier, the Iowa Supreme Court had avoided the issue by holding that
"the commission's jurisdiction should have been exhausted before this suit was brought."
State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 240 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Iowa 1976).
155. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Benham v. City of Cleveland, No.
914,017.
156. Transcript of Proceedings at 15, 19-20, Benham v. City of Cleveland, No. 914,017.
1190 [Vol. 34:1159
LATE PAYMENT CHARGES
tory exemptions to defend late payment charges against usury at-
tacks. Some uncertainty remains, however, about the status of a
municipality's rules as compared with a state's usury statute. This
situation raises three interesting and important considerations.
The first concerns the tendency of commissions and courts to deal
directly with the substantive issues in face of the usually available
and less demanding recourse to statutory exemptions as a deci-
sional ground. This tendency is not of much present concern, since
there appears to be a desire to settle the issues on the perceived
legal merits. Secondly, the implication from these statutory exemp-
tions is that late payment charges constitute interest and come
within the ambit of the usury statutes. Indeed, as one Iowa district
court concluded, "the matter of public utility late charges and dis-
counts was thought to involve interest by the Iowa Legislature. It
excepted such matters from coverage of the Consumer Credit Code
... .The legislature did not then or otherwise except such from
coverage under [Iowa's usury statute]. 157
Third, the foregoing implication relates to the role of politics
and policy in the area of public utility late charges. The central
point is that utility billing and collection systems are a matter of
policy. It is perhaps likely that only half of the electric and gas
utilities have late payment charges and that only one state in four
157. State v. City of Altoona, No. CE-7-3671, slip op. at 2 (Iowa Polk County Dist. Ct.
1977), rev'd, 274 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1979).
With respect to the Jones case, one commentator has written that:
[Elven if the charges were interest, they would not be usurious. [The Jones
court] noted that the Uniform Commercial Credit Code (U3C) and Truth in
Lending Acts have displaced the usury statute for purposes of consumer transac-
tions, which, the court suggested, include sales by utilities to consumers. The
court then reasoned that because utility companies are expressly excluded from
coverage by those two consumer protection laws, the companies may escape the
coverage of the general usury statute as well. Thus, utility regulations appear to
float in a statutory vacuum between consumer protection acts, from which they
are exempt, and the state usury law, which the court concluded is inapplicable.
The exclusion of utility rates from the U3C would appear to throw them
back into the field of general transactions that are subject to general laws. Sec-
tion 16a-1-103 of the U3C, which makes general principles of law applicable
'[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of [the uniform consumer credit
code],' supports that conclusion. Given that utility rates are excluded from the
scope of consumer protection legislation, it seems illogical for the court to call on
those acts to shelter the rates from scrutiny under the general usury statute.
... And even the conclusion that the Kansas Corporation Commission
properly has exclusive power to regulate rates does not logically lead to the re-
sult that the Commission has the power to do so without reference to general
statutes.
Note, supra note 2, at 599-600 (Footnotes omitted).
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forbids such charges entirely.158  Whether collection pressure
through a charge for late payment is superior to the threat of dis-
connection is a matter of judgment;159 and such judgment is a mat-
ter of policy for legislatures, commissions, and courts.
The legislative adoption of a late charge system, or, more cor-
rectly, of statutory provisions enabling the same, has been a matter
of considerable political pressure and lobbying. A member of the
Maryland House of Delegates remarked that "the late payment
rates resulted from 'the heavy utility lobby in Maryland,' "160 and a
Maryland utility representative has argued that reform efforts in
Maryland were due to political pressures from a liberal commission
decision in the District of Columbia. 6 In at least one instance,
state regulatory commission rules governing late payment charges
were "largely the result of negotiations between interested parties,
including intervening consumer-interest groups.""8 2 It is quite pos-
sible, therefore, that suits brought by several state attorney gener-
als to challenge late payment charges under the usury statutes
were motivated by a desire to fashion a pro-consumer public image
with a view towards re-election. 1
Of more immediate importance is the reality that statutory ex-
emptions have been the result of considerable political pressure.
The activities of NARUC in support of the exemption of public
utility late payment charges from the Federal Truth In Lending
Act are a good example. In early 1972, both the president and the
general counsel of NARUC lobbied against the proposal by Sena-
tor Lee Metcalf to delete the exemption. 16" They argued, inter alia,
that the amendment would require utilities not only to comply
with the Truth in Lending Act, but also to comply with the Fair
158. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, 1977 ANNUAL RE-
PORT ON UTILITY AND CARRIER REGULATION 521-22, table 47(a); Samuels, supra note 2, at
1152.
159. Utah Power & Light Co., 19 Pub. U. Rep. 2d 369, 373 (Utah P.S.C. 1937).
160. NARUC BULL. No. 24-1972, supra note 49, at 21.
161. Transcript of Hearing at 393-94, Md. Late Payment Charge Investigation, supra
note 96.
162. Letter from C. Burton Nelson, Chairman of the Illinois Commerce Commission, to
Dr. Warren J. Samuels (Feb. 2, 1979).
In Missouri, the State Public Service Commission reached a compromise with utility
companies on an earlier commission order dealing with billing practices after several com-
panies filed a civil suit against the order. Letter from Charles J. Fraas, Jr., Chairman of the
Missouri Public Service Commission, to Dr. Warren J. Samuels (Apr. 21, 1978).
163. Admittedly, this supposition is highly speculative. But it is one explanation for the
suits brought under the aegis of the usury laws despite the overwhelmingly adverse case law.
164. 118 CONG. REC. 14831 (1972).
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Credit Billing Act, thereby "wreaking havoc with practices re-
quired by the present regulators and ignoring present local prac-
tices which have wide consumer acceptance. . . . [S]uch a concen-
tration of regulatory power in the Federal Government is
unwarranted because such billing practices are now subject to com-
prehensive state regulation."1" The NARUC position was appar-
ently motivated chiefly by a desire to retain state regulatory juris-
diction and decisionmaking authority. Indeed, the NARUC Ad
Hoc Committee on Utility Billing Practices forthrightly acknowl-
edges that its initial creation and continuing existence is due to a
"good faith" response to the effort to remove the public utility ex-
emption, and claims credit for persuading Senator Metcalf to with-
draw his amendment."' The irony of this episode is that the origi-
nal NARUC committee reached substantive conclusions and policy
recommendations that would have drastically revised utility late
charge payment practices. 167 Their report had a negative effect on
the 1972 convention and ultimately led to an expansion of the
committee's membership and more conservative recommendations
as a countermeasure. The original report characterized net-gross
differentials as an interest charge for the extension of credit,1"
while the 1975 Report concluded that the differentials were an in-
ducement to prompt payment.1 9 The former view would have un-
dercut the statutory exemption argument and reinforced the argu-
ments in favor of usury control. Thus, even though both the 1972
and the 1975 Reports advocated a policy of full disclosure, the
question of repeal of the statutory exemption now appears settled.
Public policy and law in this area are not solely matters of
choice between perceptions embodied in legal semantics, but also
consequences of political strategy and pressure. The law regulating
public utility late payment charges and usury is clearly a matter of
policy.
V. THE EFFECTIVE RATE OF INTEREST
The legal identification of the late payment charge as interest
165. Letter to Honorable John J. Sparkman, Chairman of the Committee on Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs, from Francis Riordan, President of the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (Mar. 14, 1972), quoted in 118 CONG. REC. 14831 (1972).
166. 1975 NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 1; 1972 NARUC REPORT, supra note 5, at 2
n.9.
167. 1972 NARUC REPORT, supra note 5, at 9-11.
168. Id.
169. 1975 NARUC REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
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poses only the first general problem in determining the applicabil-
ity of the usury law. The second general problem is the calculation
of a meaningful effective annual rate of interest for comparison
with the limit imposed by the usury law. The calculation requires
the solution of a number of problems.
For a recurring charge of one and one-half percent per month,
the calculation of an effective annual rate is straightforward. One
multiplies the monthly rate by the number of months in a year:
one and one-half percent times twelve, or eighteen percent. Unlike
a nonrecurring late charge, which commences with the passing of
the due and payable period, the recurring charge becomes payable
only when the customer fails to pay the past due bill by the billing
date of the next bill; thus, no charge less than the monthly effec-
tive rate is calculable. The amount to be paid in late charges ac-
cumulates at an effective annual rate each month.
In comparison, a nonrecurring charge of five or ten percent
can produce an extremely high effective annual rate, depending on
how long payment is delayed. A five percent late charge paid after
five, fifteen, or thirty days' delay yields effective annual rates of
360%, 120%, or 60%, respectively. The great majority of late pay-
ers do, however, remit within one month and thus face an effective
annual rate of 120%, assuming a five percent late charge and a
fifteen-day due and payable period.170 Such rates are well above
170. See Samuels, supra note 2, at 1156-57.
The State of West Virginia provides that "[o]n all accounts not paid in full within
twenty (20) days of the billing date, a ten percent (10%) penalty may be added to the net
amount shown. This delayed payment penalty is not interest and is only to be collected once
for each bill where it is appropriate." WEST VIRGINIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, RULES
AND REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF WATER UTILITIES Rule 4.03(3) (1977). The recur-
ring or nonrecurring character of the late charge is, however, ambiguous. In a recent case,
the West Virginia Commission commented on the ten percent per month charge on unpaid
water bills. The commission stated that "[a] delayed payment penalty is not supposed to be
interest and is not supposed to be charged but once [sic]. Of course, if a second month's bill
is also delinquent, a delayed payment penalty may be charged for that." The commisson
found that "[a] penalty of ten percent (10%) will be added to all bills not paid within
fifteen (15) days of the date thereof." Jane Lew Water Comm'n, No. 7554 (W. Va. P.S.C.
Apr. 30, 1973).
In comparison, the Wisconsin Commission has said:
A late payment differential has as its primary purpose the encouragement of
prompt payment. An amount unpaid over two or more billing cycles should not
bear two or more late payment charges on any one specific amount outstanding,
as it is not the intended function of these charges to serve as interest on a loaned
balance. It is reasonable that a late payment charge be applied only once on any
given amount outstanding.
Slip op. at 5-6, Wis. Billing Practices Investigation, supra note 51. The more conventional
device is a flat-rate late charge applied only once.
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the rates contemplated by the usury statutes.
As has been illustrated, the effective annual rate decreases
with the prolonging of customer delay. Not only is the nonrecur-
ring nature of a late charge dysfunctional for pressuring the tardy
payer to remit, but the effective annual rate will eventually fall
below the ceiling rates of the usury statutes. A five percent charge,
for example, yields an effective annual rate of ten percent when
payment is delayed six months, but five percent when delayed one
year. Such a decline affects relatively few late payers, however, be-
cause the utility will disconnect service and either collect reconnec-
tion fees or write off the late charge as an uncollectible.
A number of persons and groups have called for the disclosure
of the effective annual rate for recurring and nonrecurring late
charges. Calculation in the latter case is difficult because the effec-
tive annual rate varies with the period of delayed payment,
whereas the recurring charge increases measurably over time at a
constant annual rate. Empirical data on actual customer payment
performance nevertheless enables the calculation of an approxi-
mate effective annual rate.17 1
Below are two tables that use data provided by two companies
in response to a suit challenging their late payment practices.17'
Each table assumes that late payment is on the last day of each
period and, in the alternative, that late payment is on the mid-
point date of each period. For each of these assumptions the effec-
tive annual rate is calculated using a flat-rate late charge of five
percent with a twenty-day due and payable period for Company A,
and a fifteen-day due and payable period for Company B. These
rates are then weighted in accordance with the actual proportion of
late payors for each indicated period. The actual averages of the
weighted effective rates are 70.5% and 128.5% for Company A and
50.8% and 96.0% for Company B. The lower percentages apply to
payments on the last day of each period and the higher percent-
ages apply to payments on the midpoint date. These rates, of
course, are clearly higher than those allowed by the state usury
171. 1972 NARUC REPPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
172. Transcript of Hearing at 5-7, Md. Late Payment Charge Investigation, supra note
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statutes, which range from six to ten percent per annum.1 1
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The purpose of this article is not to reform the law of usury,
but rather to interpret and criticize the application of that law to
public utility late charges. Several conclusions follow from the pre-
ceding discussion.
First, control of interest through usury law in the United
States has generally been ineffective. The maximum lawful rates
established by state usury laws have been widely compromised by
other provisions, such as the time-price doctrine, which effectively
exempt many transactions from the reach of the usury law. Conse-
quently, usury law as applied to late charges, and perhaps in gen-
eral, is confused and contradictory.
173. Id. at 6-7.
An interesting ambiguity is provided by MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 54C (Supp. 1980),
which provides "that any additional charge shall not exceed five percent (5%) of the net
part of the bill." A flat five percent charge without reference to any period is analytically
meaningless. One could interpret it to impose a limit of either five percent per year or five
percent per month. The Maryland Commission has regarded the five percent as an upper
limit on a recurring charge, although it also has permitted flat rate charges of five percent
(within each billing period), which may produce effective annual and monthly rates far in




















Second, there has been a renewed attack on public utility late
charges on usury grounds during the last decade. This attack, how-
ever, has largely been unsuccessful. Reform has come through com-
mission and court action lengthening the due and payable period,
lowering the nonrecurring late charges, favoring recurring or time-
differentiated late charges, and fostering the adoption of rules gov-
erning termination and disconnection procedures. Commissions
and courts have also been persuaded of the validity of the time-use
doctrine, the need to distinguish between classes of late payers,
and the dysfunctional, if not discriminatory, nature of nonrecur-
ring late charges. The combination of statutory exemptions and
competing perceptions of late payment charges, however, is likely
to preclude any change in the usury status of the late payment
charge. The consumer movement, moreover, has not focused on re-
forming the law on late charges. To the extent that public-interest
and legal-aid attorneys have been active in this area, their suc-
cesses have come largely through commission complaints, interven-
tion in rate cases, and litigation on grounds other than usury.
Finally, late charge systems, as well as the usury issue, rest on
policy considerations. Rules, doctrines, and definitions are not the
only means by which cases are decided; law is not only a system of
abstract rights and reasoning, but also a system for the accommo-
dation of selective perceptions and special interests.
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